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Abstract. This paper reviews the decline in income inequality 
that  has  taken  place  over  2002-2007  in  most  Latin  American 
countries  against  the  background  of  its  steady  increase  over 
1980-2002.  The  paper  analyzes  then  the  factors  that  could 
explain this trend reversal. It focuses in particular on favorable 
external  conditions,  cyclical  factors,  improvements  in  the 
distribution  of  educational  achievements  and  the  subsequent 
drop in skill-premium, and changes in macroeconomic and social 
policies introduced in several countries, particularly by a growing 
number  of  left-of-centre  governments  which  have  come  to 
power  during  the  last  decade.    An  econometric  test
2  for  the 
years  1990-2007  indicate  that,  in  addition  to  a  favorable 
business  cycle  and  external  conditions,  a  decline  in  skill 
premium  and  the  new  policy  model  of  fiscally  prudent  social-
democracy  which  is  emerging  this  decade  in  much  of  Latin 
America  impacted  favorably  the  distribution  of  income.  If  this 
approach  will  survive  the  current  crisis,  much  of  the  recent 
inequality decline is likely to become permanent.    
 
JEL: D31, E6, H53, I28, I38. 
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1. Introduction   
The  gloom  and  doom  caused  in  Latin  America  by  the  current  financial  crisis  has 
obscured the positive changes that have taken place in the region since 2002. The 
most evident of them is the six-year uninterrupted economic expansion of 2003-2008 
during which the average growth rate of GDP averaged 5.5 percent a year, lower only 
to that registered over 1967-74 (Ocampo 2008). Such steady expansion of output was 
to some extent a rebound from the stagnation recorded during the “lost half decade” 
of 1998-2002, but featured also a rise in the investment rate which grew from 16-17 
to 21-22 percent of GDP over the same period, a level lower only to that reached at 
the  end  of  the  Seventies.  The  boom  was  accompanied  also  by  a  nine  percentage 
points decline in the poverty headcount ratio and, central to the topic of this paper, a 
significant drop in income inequality.   
 
Other important changes which are less frequently emphasized in the literature were 
recorded  starting  from  the  mid  1990s.  The  first  concerns  the  steady  gains  in 
educational achievements realized since the beginning of the 1990s by both center-
right and left-of-center (LOC) regimes – both social-democratic and populist - and the 
parallel decline in many aspects of educational inequality (Gasparini et al. 2009). The 
second change is the slowdown in the growth of the labor force which according to 
CELADE  (2006)  dropped  from  3.1  percent  in  the  1990s  to  2.2  percent  during  the 
current decade. Together with a faster growth of labor demand for unskilled workers 
and in the supply of skilled workers (see later), the slower increase in unskilled labor 
supply possibly contributed to reducing unemployment and halting the long term rise 
in the wage premium. The third, and possibly most important, change concerns the 
shift towards democratization and the election of LOC governments (Panizza 2005). 
Indeed, during the last decade the political centre of gravity of the region’s shifted 
with surprising regularity towards political regimes which place greater emphasis on 
distributive and social issues while, at the same time, avoiding the populist excesses 
of the 1980s.  However, the recent coup in Honduras, and the election of a centre-
right president in Panama in July 2009, may signal that such trend has reached its 
nadir.   
 
To what an extent do these and other changes explain the decline in income inequality 
recorded  since  2002  in  most  of  the  region?  To  what  an  extent  are  these  changes 
permanent or to what extent will they be overturned by the current crisis
3? These are 
the main issues explored by the paper. Part 2 reviews the recent decline in income 
inequality. Part 3 discusses the factors that could explain such decline. Part 4 tests 
econometrically the relative importance of these factors, while Part 5 concludes and 
offers a few conjectures on the inequality changes that may be expected in the future.         
  
  
2. The distribution of income in Latin America in 
historical perspective  
The colonial origins of income inequality in Latin America have been well documented 
in the classical work of Engerman and Sokoloff (2005). These authors theorized that 
high historical levels of inequality in the distribution of land, other forms of wealth, 
human  capital  and  political  power  which  benefited  a  tiny  agrarian,  mining  and 
commercial  oligarchy led to the development of institutions that perpetuated these 
inequalities, furthering their deleterious impact on long run economic growth. Such 
                                                 
3 CEPAL’s Economic and Social Survey 2008-9 predicts a 1.9 percent fall in GDP in 2009 and a recovery 
of 3.1 percent in 2010, with a cumulative loss of ten points of GDP growth in relation to the 2003-8 
trend.    3 
hypotheses have been fully verified in Latin America. Indeed, with the  exception  of 
Uruguay  and  Argentina,  in  the  early-mid  1950s,  the  Gini  coefficients  of  the 
distribution of income in the region ranged  between  0.45  and  0.60 (Altimir 1996), 
i.e. among the  highest  in  the  world (Klasen and Nowak-Lehman, 2007).  The  rapid 
growth which followed the adoption of the import substitution strategy in the 1950s 
and 1960s had - on average - a further un-equalizing impact. In contrast, during 
the 1970s  inequality fell  moderately  in  most  of  the  region with the exception of the 
Southern Cone (Gasparini et al 2009) where  an  extreme  version of the neo-liberal 
reforms  had  been  implemented  by  military  juntas.  The  combination  of  a  rise  in 
inequality over the 1950s-1960s and of a modest fall over the 1970s made that by 
1980,  all  main Latin  American  countries  had a higher income concentration  than in 
the early-mid 1950s. 
 
During the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s, inequality in Latin America was affected by the 
1982-4  world  recession,  the  debt  crisis,  a  large  decline  in  commodity  prices, and 
the  recessionary adjustments  introduced to respond to these shocks. Altogether, the 
1980s  were  characterized  by  regressive  distributive  outcomes  and,  during  this 
period,  income  inequality fell  only  in  Colombia,  Uruguay  and  Costa  Rica  out  of  11 
countries  with  reliable  data (Altimir,  1996).  Despite  the  return  to  a  moderate 
growth  and  extensive  internal  and  external  liberalization,  income  polarization  did 
not  decline  during  the  1990s  and  in  half  of  the  cases  it worsened further, if at a 
slower  pace  than  in  the  1980s  (Gasparini  et  al.2009,  and  Figure  1).  A  review  of 
inequality  changes  over  the  1990s  based  on  76  standardized  surveys  for  17 
countries  covering  90  percent  of  the regional population  shows  that  inequality rose 
in  10  countries  and  stagnated or declined in seven (Székely 2003). The worsening 
was  particularly  acute  during  the  “half  lost  decade”  of  1998-2002.  The  income 
polarization  of  the  1980s  and  1990s  resulted  from  fast  inequality  rises  during 
recessionary  spells  and  slow  inequality  declines  during  periods  of  recovery. A key 
feature of the trend towards growing inequality was a decline in the labor share in 
total income and a parallel rise in the capital share. For instance, between 1980 and 
the late 1980s, the labor share declined by 5-6 percentage points in Argentina, Chile 
and Venezuela and by ten in Mexico. Such trend was not reversed during the mild 
recovery  of  1991-98 (Tokman  1986).  In  several  countries  –  as  in  Chile  during  the 
military  dictatorship  –  the  fall  in  the  labor  share  was  due  –  inter  alia  -  to  the 
relaxation  of  norms  on  workers  dismissals,  a  reduction  of  the  power  of  trade 
unions, the suspension of wage indexation, a cutback in public employment  and  in 
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Figure 1. Changes in the Gini coefficients of the distribution of household income per capita, from early 
to late 1990s, and from the early to the mid 2000s.   
 
        Source: Gasparini et al (2009)   
 
 
minimum wage, as well as to the reduction or elimination of wealth, capital gains 
and profit 
taxes. From an analytical perspective, the impact of the above changes on the labor 
share  can  be  decomposed into  five  effects  (ibid.). First,  sluggish  growth  brought 
about  a  slowdown  in  jobs  creation.  Second,  informal  employment  became  much 
more  common.  Third,  formal  sector  wages grew more slowly than GDP  per  capita. 
Fourth,  minimum  wages  mostly  fell  in  relation  to  average  wages.  Fifth, the skill 
premium, i.e. the wage differentials  by  skill,  widened  particularly  during  the  1990s 
in parallel with widespread trade liberalization (Székely 2003).   
  
In  contrast  to  the  trends  observed  in  the  1980s  and  1990s,  during  the  2000s 
income  inequality  fell  in  most  of  the  region,  particularly  since  2001-2.  Figure  1 
above  shows  that  inequality  declined  between  the  early  2000s  and  the  mid 
2000s in all 17 countries analyzed with the exception of Nicaragua (where inequality 
rose) and Honduras and Colombia (where it remained broadly constant). While the 
average decline in the Gini coefficient was of 2-3 points, in countries ruled for most 
of 2002-7 by LOC governments, such as Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela, the drop 
was much more pronounced. Lustig (2009) arrives at similar conclusions, while noting 
further  that  the  decline  in  income  inequality  observed  in  LOC  countries  was  more 
pronounced  among  the  populist  than  the  social-democratic  regimes.  The  recent 
decline in inequality was also characterized by greater convergence at lower level of   5 
inequality, a trend opposite to that recorded during the prior two decades, when the 
countries’ Gini coefficients converged at a higher level of inequality
4.   
 
 
3. Factors explaining the decline in income inequality over 
2002 2007  
Four groups of factors are discussed hereafter: the favorable external environment of 
2002-2007,  the  rapid  regional  growth  of  GDP  during  this  period,  the  longer  term 
improvements in human capital formation and in its distribution, and the changes in 
economic and social policies part of the ‘new LOC Latin American model’ which is has 
been gradually taking shape during the last decade.  
 
3.1 External conditions (i) Terms of trade gains. Since the beginning of the 
new century, the rapid growth of China and other Asian countries exerted a favorable 
impact on the exports and economic performance of Latin America. The pull effect of 
Asian  growth  has  entailed  a  large  increase  in  Latin  America’s  exports,  which  has 
become the most dynamic component of aggregate demand in the region. As a result, 
the  regional  export/GDP  ratio  rose  from  13  to  22  percent  of  GDP  between  the 
average for the 1990s and  2006. The rapid increase in the value of exports was due 
to significant improvements in both export prices and volumes. In 2007, the index of 
the commodity prices exported by the region rose for the sixth year running, with the 
highest  increases recorded  by  energy  and  agricultural  products such as vegetable 
oils,  flour  and  seeds (CEPAL 2007).  
 
As  a  result,  in  2007  the  average  regional  terms  of  trade  index  exceeded  by  33 
percent its average level for the 1990s, generating in this way a positive yearly shock 
equal to 3.7 of the regional GDP between 2003 and 2007 (Ocampo 2008). However, 
the terms of trade evolved in dissimilar ways within the  region (CEPAL  2007). For 
instance, between the 1990s and 2007 the terms of trade index rose by 52 percent 
in South America, 21 percent in Mexico, and 13 percent for Mercosur, but fell by 13 
percent  in  Central  America,  a  region  which  depends  on  imported  energy.  Of  the 
countries adversely affected  by  terms  of  trade  changes,  a  first  subset  (Paraguay, 
Uruguay,  Panamá  and  Nicaragua)  further  specialized  in  the  export  of  traditional 
agricultural commodities. A second group  (Costa  Rica,  El  Salvador,  Guatemala,  and 
Honduras)  switched  to  the  export  of  textiles  and  recorded  a  rise  in  emigration 
(Perez Caldentey and Vernengo 2007). 
 
What was the likely impact of these changes in terms of trade and export volumes 
on income inequality?  A  partial  equilibrium  analysis suggests  that,  given  the  high 
concentration of the ownership of  land  and  mines (particularly  by foreign  TNCs
5) 
prevailing  in  the  region,  the  recent  gains  in  terms  of  trade  likely  generated  – 
ceteris  paribus  -  a  disequalizing  effects on  the  functional  and  size distribution  of 
income.  Indeed,  production  in  these  sectors  is  very  land,  resource,  and  capital-
intensive,  and  their  employment  generation  capacity  limited
6.  However,  if  these 
rents  accrue  to  the  state  (as  in  Bolivia)  or  if  private  rents  are  taxed  (as  in 
                                                 
4The coefficient of variation of the national Gini indexes fell from 0.10 to 0.07 over 1992-2006 (Gasparini 
et al 2009). 
5An important part of the gains in terms of trade left the region in the form of profit remittances, as 
the exploitation of natural resources in Latin America is often in the hands of TNCs. Chile and Peru 
account for over half of the regional outflow of profit remittances, though they account for only 8 
percent of the region’s GDP.  
6 For instance, in Argentina, agriculture accounts for a modest 8 percent of the total labor force.    6 
Argentina) and the resources so obtained are redistributed in a progressive way, then 
the rise in land and mining rents can have a favorable distributive effects. Yet, the 
empirical evidence suggests a weak relation between terms of trade and tax/GDP and 
non-tax/GDP ratio in Latin America. The only relatively strong correlation (r = 0.63) 
between terms of trade and the non-tax revenue/GDP ratio was found for the eight 
main commodity exporters over 2003-2007 (Cornia and Martorano 2009).  
 
In the absence of a CGE model, the  general  equilibrium  effects  of  the  commodity 
boom  on income  inequality  are even more difficult  to map out.  Improvements  in 
the  balance  of  payments  due  to  terms  of  trade  gains  can,  for  instance,  relax  the 
foreign-exchange  constraint  to  growth  and  stimulate production in  labor  intensive 
industries  with  the  effect  of reducing income  inequality.  A second equalizing effect 
could occur via a reduction in interest rates (due to an expansion in money creation 
from  abroad  induced  by  growing  export  receipts)  which  would  favors  firms  and 
households  and  penalize  banks  and  rentiers.  All  in all,  while  it  is  plausible  that  the 
recent commodity bonanza had a favorable effect on growth, its impact on inequality 
remains uncertain.  
 
(ii) Rising migrant remittances. During the last decade, Latin America enjoyed 
also a  sharp rise i n   migrant  remittances which benefitted in particular the Central 
American and Caribbean countries,  Mexico  and  Ecuador. The surge in migration and 
remittances  occurred  mainly  during  the  crisis  years  of  1998  and  2003,  though  it 
continued  during  the  boom  of  2003-2008.  Official  remittances  to  the  region 
increased from US$ 2 to 59 billion dollars between 1980 and 2005 or from 0.23 to 2 
percent of regional GDP (Table 1). In 2007, they accounted for 2.3 percent of the  
 
Table 1. Remittances/GDP in countries affected by positive and negative terms of trade    
  1980-1990  1991-2001  2002-2006 
Countries that recently experienced favourable terms-of-trade effects 
Argentina   0.07  0.22  0.38 
Bolivia   1.98  2.17  2.51 
Colombia   1.49  1.87  3.32 
Ecuador   0.60  3.50  6.46 
Peru   0.80  1.64  2.07 
Venezuela   -0.42  -0.22  -0.06 
Mexico   0.96  1.19  2.36 
AVERAGE    0.69  1.26  2.12 
Countries that recently experienced unfavourable terms-of-trade effects 
Dominican Republic  4.40  8.67              11.37 
El Salvador    8.85              14.01              15.86 
Guatemala    1.51  1.95              10.47 
Honduras    3.64  8.11              20.48 
Nicaragua   5.48              10.05              14.84 
Paraguay  …  1.77                2.91 
Uruguay  0.17  0.29  0.77 
AVERAGE    3.59  4.91  8.85 
Source: Adapted from Perez Caldentey and Vernengo (2008) 
 
regional GDP (CEPAL 2007) but for over 11 percent in Central America, 2.8 percent 
in Mexico and about 20 percent in Grenada, Guyana and Jamaica. Interestingly, with   7 
the exception of Ecuador, remittances plaid a greater role in countries which did not 
experience  terms  of  trade  gains,  meaning  that  Latin  American  countries  support 
their  current  account  balance  by  exporting either  primary  commodities  or  migrant 
labor, and only a modest amount of manufactured goods.  
 
For  the  above  group  of  countries,  one  may  be  tempted  to  establish  a  causal  link 
between rising remittances and falling inequality. Yet, the literature on the inequality 
impact of remittances suggests that their short and medium term effect tends to be 
un-equalizing. Indeed, in developing countries mainly middle-class people are able to 
finance the high costs of illegal  migration
7. As a consequence, the remittances will 
accrue  not  to  the  poor  but  mainly  to  middle  income  groups.  In  addition,  in  the 
countries of origin the migration of skilled workers tends to raise their wage rate in 
relation to that of unskilled workers. Of course, the final distributive effect depends on 
if  and how the families of migrants receiving remittances share them with the  low 
income groups. In addition, remittances may reduce inequality over long term, if the 
creation of migrant networks in the countries of destination reduces migration costs, 
thus  making  migration  accessible  also  to  low  unskilled  workers.  The  long  term 
inequality impact of migration is mediated also by its effect on growth. In this regard, 
most  of  the  available  evidence  (IMF  2005)  shows  that  remittances  raise  current 
consumption, reduce volatility, and improve the creditworthiness in the countries of 
origin, but do not have a significant effect on the investment rate and the growth of 
GDP. In view of all this, one would not expect that migrant remittances plaid a central 
role in reducing income inequality, either directly or indirectly.  
 
(iii)  Increasing  availability  of  external  finance.   Between  2004  and  2007,  the 
region  recorded  a  surge  in  capital  inflows,  the  variation  of  which  amounted  to  2.4 
percent of the region’s GDP (Ocampo 2008). Portfolio flows accounted for most of the 
rise in foreign financing while FDI stagnated at 22 percent of the region’s GDP. The 
portfolio flows mainly consisted in purchases of shares and securities in regional stock 
markets.  As  a  result,  the  stock  market  capitalization  of  the  seven  largest  regional 
economies quadrupled its value between middle 2004 and end 2007 (Ocampo 2009). 
In  addition,  this  large  capital  inflow  facilitated  the  accumulation  of  international 
reserves  which  reduced  country  spreads  on  international  loans,  while  the  drop  of 
international  interest  rates  exerted  a  downward  pressure  on  domestic  rates.  
However, the increased availability of foreign finance benefitted mainly large capital- 
and skill-intensive companies and banks while it did not ease the financing problems 
of  labor-intensive  small  and  medium  enterprises,  possibly  inducing  in  this  way 
adverse distributional effects.    
   
Also in this case, it is difficult to trace the indirect effects of financial exuberance on 
inequality. It is likely that – as in the case of terms of trade and remittances - the 
indirect  effect  on  growth,  employment  and  inequality  was  positive  due  to  the 
relaxation  of  the  balance  of  payments  constraint.  Yet,  financial  exuberance  caused 
also  an  appreciation  of  the  real  exchange  rate  which  penalized  the  labor-intensive 
traded sector of the economy and, with it, the distribution of income (Taylor 2004).  
 
3.2 A positive business cycle   
As noted, from end 2002 the region recorded a strong recovery. The growth rate of 
GDP/capita doubled between the average of the 1990s and 2003-7 in South America 
and improved by 50 percent in Central  America.  Only  few  countries (such as Chile 
                                                 
7 However, in Mexico most of the migrants come from low income groups (communication of Rafael de 
los Hoyos).     8 
which  recorded  a  Tiger-like  growth  already  in  the  1990s)  did  not  improve  their 
performance. While  all  countries improved their performance, in  countries  ruled by 
LOC governments GDP growth was higher by about one point than in countries ruled 
by  conservative  regimes (Figure 2).  
 









Growth GDP/c Inflation Overall Fiscal Balance/GDP
LOC
NO - LOC
Source: Author’s elaboration on ECLAC’s Badecon for the growth of GDP/c and fiscal balance/GDP, and 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook 2008 for inflation. Note: The inflation rate of LOC countries would be 6.6 
% (i.e. lower than the NO-LOC countries’ average) if Venezuela (which recorded an average inflation of 
21% during this period) is excluded.  
 
 
Economic theory suggests that in developing countries characterized by flexible labor 
markets an increase in GDP reduces inequality as it tends to increase labor absorption 
and,  under  certain  conditions,  the  wage  rate,  while  a  contraction  of  GDP  raises 
inequality  as  wages  drop  and  the  workers  made  redundant  are  not  covered  by 
unemployment  insurance.  Past  evidence  from  the  region  confirms  this  hypothesis 
(Altimir,  1993). A decline in inequality following a return to growth is, of course, far 
from automatic, as it depends on whether the growth pattern is pro-poor, neutral or 
immiserizing. Yet, the evidence for the 2002-2007 period confirms that the vigorous 
recovery  of  those  years,  as  well  as  the  labor  policies  analyzed  in  section  3.4, 
generated  an  equalizing  effect  on  the  distribution  of  wages.  Urban  unemployment 
dropped  from  10.7  to  8  percent  between  2002 and  2007 for the region as a whole 
(Table 2). Over 5.3 million new jobs were created – i.e. at a much faster than during 
the previous decade. The new jobs were mainly taken by low–income groups,  thus 
contributing  significantly  to  the  drop  in  wage  inequality.  Such  improvements  were 
more pronounced in the LOC than in the NO-LOC countries. Indeed, between 2002 
and 2007, the unemployment rate fell from 13.2 to 7.9 percent in the first group and 
from 10 to 8 percent in the second. Likewise, the average wage index rose from 98.6 
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Table 2. Labour market trends for Latin America as a whole, 1990-2007   
Average wages 
























1990  63.8  6.2  62.6  55.0  63.3  384  372  278 
2002  68.5  10.7  60.9*  52.8  54.6*  397  457  264 
2005  70.1  9.7  61.4  53.7  59.4  405  449  267 
2007  70.0  8.0  63.1  55.5  61.0  423  452  …. 
Source: compilation on different tables in CEPAL (2006 and 2008), IDLA database and OIT’s ‘Panorama 
Laboral’ (http://www.oit.org.pe/WDMS/bib/publ/panorama/panorama08.pdf) for the % of wage earners 
and workers paying social security. Notes: * refers to 2000, ** the computation of the regional average 
is based on 13 Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay. 
For Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico and Venezuela the 2007 data are proxied by those of 2006. 
 
 
3.3. An improvement in the distribution of educational achievements  
Another important factor in the recent fall in income inequality is the rise in enrolment 
rates  recorded  at  all  educational  levels  since  the early-mid  1990s  (Gasparini  et  al. 
2009),  and  the  subsequent  reduction  in  enrolment  inequality  in  primary  and 
secondary education.  
 
Figure 3. Percentage changes in average years if education of the adult population and the Gini of 
educational achievements between the mid 1990s and the mid 200s in 18 Latin American countries  
 
Source: Gasparini et al (2009)   10 
For  instance,  the  probability  that  a  boy/girl  from  the  bottom  decile  completes 
secondary school in relation to that of a child from the top decile rose from 36.7 to 
50 percent between 1990 and 2005 (CEPAL 2007a)
8. The surge in enrolments raised 
the average number of years of education of the working population, while reducing 
the inequality of its distribution in both LOC and NO-LOC countries (Figure 3). While 
the  effect  of  these  trends  on  the  skill-premium  are  not  automatic,  CEDLAS  data 
confirm that the gains in human capital formation and educational inequality of the 
last 15 years were accompanied by a widespread drop in the skill-premium during the 
2000s  (Cornia  and  Martorano  2009).  In  addition,  a  detailed  IPEA  study  (cited  in 
CEPAL  2006) which decomposed  the  fall  in income inequality in Brazil over 2000-
2006 confirmed that two thirds of the decline was due to  a  fall  in labor  incomes 
inequality  caused  by a drop in educational inequality among workers and in wage 
premium by education level. 
 
 
3.4 The spread of LOC regimes and the adoption of a new policy model    
Latin America has been for long a symbol of authoritarian political systems, unequal 
distribution of assets, and limited redistribution by the state. However, during the last 
twenty  years,  the  political  landscape  has  witnessed  a  steady  drive  towards 
democratization and, starting from the mid-late 1990s, a shift in political orientation 
towards  LOC  regimes.  As  documented  by  the  results  of  different  waves  of  the 
Latinobarometro
9, such shift was to a large extent explained by growing frustration with 
the  disappointing  results  of  the  Washington  Consensus  policies  implemented  in  the 
1980s  and  1990s.  Among  other  things,  such  policies  caused  a  shrinkage  of  the 
industrial  working  class,  a  weakening  of  the  unions,  rising  unemployment,  and  a 
substantial enlargement of informal sector and self-employment. The shift away from 
such approach began with the election in 1990 of Patricio Alwyn in Chile. It continued 
with the election of LOC leaders in the late 1990s and early 2000s, as in the case of 
Chavez in Venezuela in 1998, Lula in Brazil in 2002, Kirchener in Argentina in 2003, 
Tabarè Vasquez in Uruguay in 2004, Morales and Correa in Bolivia and Ecuador in 2006, 
Lugo in Paraguay in 2008, and Funes in El Salvador in March 2009. By mid 2009, of the 
18 Latin American countries analyzed in this study, only Colombia and Mexico were run 
by centre-right governments, while three are run by centrist regimes and 13 by LOC 
governments.  
As  noted  by  Panizza  (2005)  and  Lustig  (2009),  the  LOC  parties  differ  substantially 
among each other. Some of them can be defined as ‘social-democratic’, as in is the 
case  of  Chile’s  Partido  Socialista,  Uruguay’s  Frente  Amplio  and  Brazil’s  Partido  dos 
Trabalhadores (Panizza 2005). These parties have their roots in organizations of the 
working class, but have evolved into broad coalitions comprising sectors of business 
and the middle classes, the urban and rural poor, the unemployed and the informal 
sector workers. They have abandoned any notion of revolutionary break in favor of 
electoral politics and respect for the institutions of liberal democracy. In contrast, a 
second group of countries (such as Argentina and Ecuador) developed left-nationalist 
platforms, while Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua (since 2007) are characterized by a 
radical-populist  approach  entailing  a  redistribution  of  assets  nationally  and 
internationally.   
 
                                                 
8 However, during the same period, the gap between rich and poor in accessing tertiary education 
widened. 
9 Corporación Latinobarómetro is a non-profit NGO based in Santiago, Chile. Since 1995 it carries out 
polls on various  political topics by surveying 19.000 households from 18 countries of the region 
(http://www.latinobarometro.org).   11 
Matters of social justice and economic development are at the core of the new LOC 
parties’ identity. However, in the pursuit of such objectives, the LOC parties (including 
the populist ones) avoided the ill-conceived approach to budget deficits and inflation 
typical of the populist policies of the 1980s (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1991). In fact, 
the  LOC  economic  model  incorporates  into  its  paradigm  liberal  policies  such  as  a 
sound fiscal policy and low inflation, an awareness of the inefficiencies associated with 
some  forms  of  state  intervention  and  protectionism,  the  primacy  of  the  market  in 
determining prices, regional trade integration and openness to foreign investment. At 
the same time, its concern for poverty and inequality, recognition of market failures 
and  the  increasing  importance  assigned  to  strengthening  state  institutions  are  in 
sharp  contrast  with  the  neo-liberal  emphasis  on  shrinking  the  state  and  the  self-
sustained role of the markets (Panizza 2005). 
 
Despite  this  paradigmatic  shift,  measures  to  reduce  the  glaring  wealth 
concentration  existing  in  the  region  have  seldom  made  their  way  on  the  LOC 
governments’ agenda, with the exception of Bolivia (which nationalized the  mines 
and  is  planning  a  land  reform),  Venezuela  (which  renegotiated  oil  royalties  and 
nationalized  key  industries,  including  steel,  electricity  and  telecommunications)  and 
since 2007 Nicaragua.  The moderate  stance adopted by most LOC countries is likely 
explained by  the  fact  that  –  in  the  absence  of  overwhelming  political  support, and 
in view of the heterogeneity of LOC coalitions –  radical reforms would have generated 
tensions affecting business climate, capital flights, and  electoral  support.  In addition, 
the advent to power of progressive regimes did not  reduce the influence of dominant 
interest groups which – though numerically small – are still powerful and can sway 
the  public  opinion  on  controversial  issues.  As  a  result,  the  LOC  policy  model 
resembles  more  the  ‘Redistribution  With  Growth’  model  (Chenery  et  al.  1978) 
rather than  the  more  radical  ‘Redistribution  Before  Growth’  model  which  sees  the 
redistribution  of  assets  and  opportunities  as  a  necessary  step  to  exit  the  under 
consumption  trap  afflicting  developing  countries.  In  contrast,  the  measures  in  the 
field of labor market, social expenditure, and transfers have been more far reaching.  
 
LOC governments have thus developed a new economic paradigm and social contract 
that  binds  together  their  traditional  and  emergent  constituencies  through  a 
combination of macroeconomic stability, neo-corporatist and participatory institutions, 
and  redistribution  via  taxation  and  targeted  social  programs  (Panizza  2005a).  The 
main components of the new model are reviewed hereafter:   
 
(i) Macroeconomic policies. Overall, the measures introduced in this areas are 
broadly  aligned  to  what  can  be  defined  a  pro-poor  macroeconomic  paradigm 
(Cornia 2006). Its key elements are: 
 
-  A  fiscal  policy  aiming  at  balancing  the  budget  in  the  context  of  an 
expansionary expenditure policy. Traditionally, Latin America adopted pro-cyclical 
expansionary  fiscal  policies  that  boost  growth  during  periods  of  external buoyancy 
but build up vulnerabilities which explode when the favorable conditions disappear. 
This  stance  has  been  changed  during  the  recent  decade.  A  decline  in  the  budget 
deficit was targeted in all countries, despite an increase in public expenditure (Figure 
2).  Overall  fiscal  deficits  have  typically  been  reduced  below  one  percent  of  GDP 
(i.e. lower than the EU and US) and in several cases were turned into surpluses. As a 
result, in 2006 and 2007 the average central government budget for the region as a 
whole  was  in  equilibrium,  suggesting  a  shift  towards  a  countercyclical  fiscal 
management (Ocampo 2007). A strong version of such policy, which requires that the 
extra  revenue  collected  during  upturns  is  saved  and  is  used  to  support  public   12 
expenditure  during  bad  years,  was  followed  in  Chile,  Peru  and  Argentina.  A  ‘weak 
version’, consisting in balancing the budget or achieving a small surplus, spending 
then the extra revenue collected during the upturn was followed by most countries 
due to the difficulties faced by democratic regimes in convincing the electorate about 
the need for fiscal austerity in periods of rising revenue (Ocampo (2008).   
 
  Rising  tax/GDP ratios. Tax policy has undergone gradual but deep changes, both 
during the 1990s and even more so since 2002. As a result, the  regional tax  and 
non-tax  revenue  of  the  central  government  including  social  security  contributions 
rose  from  15  percent  of  GDP  in  1990  to  17  percent  in 2000,  and 20.2 percent in 
2007  (CEPAL,  2007).  Very  large  increases  were  recorded  over  2002-2007  in 
Argentina  and  Brazil  (9-10   points  of  GDP),  Colombia  (8.5  points),  Bolivia  (10 
points),  and  Venezuela (6  points), and only  Mexico  experienced  a  small decline in 
the  tax/GDP  ratio  (Cetrangolo  and  Gomez-Sabaini  2006).  By  mid  2000s,  Brazil, 
Argentina, Uruguay and Costarica had reached levels of taxation similar to those of 
the US and Japan. In contrast, with  tax/GDP ratios at  around  10-12 percent, several 
Central  American  countries  remained  mired  in  a  ‘low  revenue  development  trap’ 
which  makes  them  unable  to  fund  pro-poor  and  pro-growth  public  goods.  This 
revenue increase constitutes an important achievement, as inability or unwillingness 
to raise taxation was an main factor in the large accumulation of public debt during 
the 1970s, the debt crisis of the 1980s, and the macro instability of the 1990s. 
 
The  revenue  increase  resulted  from  a  widespread  reduction  in  excises  and  tariffs 
(following trade liberalization), a rise in indirect taxes (VAT in primis), an increase in 
personal and corporate income tax, and stagnation of wealth taxes and social security 
contributions  (Table  3).  LOC  countries  appear  to  have  performed  better,  both    in 
terms  of  additional  revenue  raised  and  of  the  progressivity  of  the  tax  instruments 
used  (ibid.).  Countries  benefiting  from  increases  in  the  price  of  hydrocarbons, 
metals  and  agricultural exports recorded an important growth in public revenue
10.  
 
Table 3. Tax and non tax revenue/ GDP ratio of the central government in 1990, 2002 and 2007, and 
changes in tax structure in LOC and NO-LOC countries. 
Tax revenue/GDP  Non tax 
revenue/GDP 
Changes over 2002 7 (% points of 
GDP) 








































Source: Cornia and Martorano (2009)          
 
While  the  improvement  in  terms  of  trade  certainly  contributed  to  raise  the  tax 
revenue/GDP ratio, it must be noted that its increase preceded the commodity boom 
and  depended  on  broader  efforts  at  widening  the  direct  and  indirect  tax  base  and 
                                                 
10 Governments  developed  a  variety  of  fiscal  mechanisms  for  appropriating  part  of  the increase  in 
commodity  prices  (CEPAL  2007,  p.31).  Argentina  financed  part  of  its  spending  from  resources 
generated by export duties. In turn, Venezuela,  Bolivia  and  Chile created new  taxes  to  increase  the 
revenue  generated  from  their  non-  renewable  resources.  As  a  result,  the  share  of  fiscal  resources 
represented by such revenue in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia and Mexico rose from of 27.8, 7.6, 9.9 and 29.4 
percent in the 1990s to 34.8, 20, 14.2 and 37.5 in 2006-2007.    13 
reducing evasion (Table 3). Several  countries  introduced a surrogate  tax  on financial 
transactions which, while potentially distortive (Cetrangolo and Sabaini  2006), was a 
second  best  tool  to  tax  assets the distribution of  which  is highly concentrated. In 
addition,  Brazil  and  Argentina  introduced  selective  export  taxes  which  are  very 
likely progressive, as they capture part of the land rent and windfall profits due to 
world  price  rises  accruing  to  a  sector  characterized  by  high  asset  and  income 
concentration. Overall, while  tax systems in the region still have a long way to go to 
improve their progressivity, the recent revenue increase was in good part achieved by 
direct and other progressive taxes (Table 3).  
 
-  Monetary  policy  and  inflation  targeting.  As suggested by the ‘impossible 
trinity theorem’, in economies with an open capital account, such as those of Latin 
America, the monetary authorities can count only on few instruments (accumulation 
of reserves and sterilization) to control the fall in interest rates and credit expansion 
during  booms  generated  by  export  bonanzas  and  large  financial  inflows.  Argentina 
over  2002-8  and  Colombia  in  2007,  however,  also  reverted  to  capital  controls 
(Ocampo  2008).  In  most  other  countries,  both  LOC  and  conservative,  monetary 
policy  was  either  accommodating  or  neutral,  tolerating  therefore  (with  the  major 
exception of Brazil) low or even negative real interest rates and higher inflation rates. 
Monetary  policy aimed also  at  reducing  the  extensive dollarization of the financial 
system.  Argentina conducted a radical de-dollarization during the crisis of 2002, and 
Peru adopted a policy of gradual de-dollarization, together with Bolivia and Uruguay. 
In  particular,  there  was  a  tendency  for  foreign  currency-denominated  public-sector 
bonds  issued  on  local  capital  markets  to  dwindle.  Finally,  there  was  a  general 
strengthening of Central Bank independence. 
 
- Exchange rate regime. With the exception of Brazil and Venezuela, most LOC 
and NO LOC countries  abandoned  the  free  floats  and  fixed  pegs regimes adopted 
during the prior decade, and opted instead for a competitive exchange rate regime or 
for managed floats aiming at preventing the appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
As noted by Ocampo (2007), consistently with this approach, Central Banks reduced 
the  supply  of  foreign  exchange  through  interventions  in  the  currency  market, 
adopted  a  coherent  fiscal  and  policy,  and  in  a  few  cases,  introduced  capital 
controls.  The  clearest  example  of  this  policy  is  given  by  Argentina,  where  the 
maintenance  of  a  competitive  exchange  rate  has  been  a  cornerstone  of 
macroeconomic policy (Frenkel and Rapetti, 2008)
11. In this country, the  adoption  of 
a  competitive  exchange  rate  shifted  labor  towards  the  unskilled  labor-intensive 
traded sectors (mainly manufacturing) with a strong equalizing effect (Damill 2004, 
cited in World Bank 2005). 
 
In 2006 and 2007,  this exchange rate policy  came  under pressure owing to large 
increases in export prices, capital inflows and remittances. As a result, the ensuing 
large  current  and  capital  account  surpluses  lead  to  a  modest  appreciation  of  4.8 
percent  of  the  extra-regional  real  exchange  rate  for  the  region  as  a whole,  with 
stronger effects felt in Colombia, Brazil and Venezuela (CEPAL 2007). Without a 
huge accumulation  of  reserves and parallel sterilization efforts by the central banks, 
several  countries  would  have  shown  stronger  symptoms  of  Dutch  disease  and 
                                                 
11  Such  policy  requires  that  the  build-up  of  international  reserves  during  upturns  be  matched  by 
measures to sterilize their monetary impact. Sterilization of this type is easier when there is a fiscal 
surplus. Otherwise it is necessary to sterilize via a mix of traditional open market operations, sales of 
central bank bonds in the market, or higher reserve requirements. For this reason, a fiscal surplus is an 
essential complement to the policy aiming at maintaining a  stable and competitive real exchange rate. 
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accelerating inflation in the non-tradable sector which – if uncontrolled – would have 
generated adverse growth  and  distributive  impact  (Taylor  2004).   
 
-  Trade  and external indebtedness.  The  free  trade  policies  adopted  in  the  past 
have  not  been overturned,  in part because the newly adopted exchange rate policies 
offered  some  protection  to  the  tradable  sector.  In  contrast,  the  trend  towards 
international trade integration was substantially reoriented. The Free Trade Area of 
the  Americas  seems  to  have  stalled  while,  in  contrast,  regional  trade  integration 
developed  rapidly,  especially  in  the  field  of  manufacturing  exports.  The  free  trade 
agreements  with  industrialized  countries,  in  contrast,  strengthened  the  exports  of 
primary  commodities,  with  the  possible  exception  of  Mexico  which  increased  its 
exports  of  manufactured  goods,  which  in  most  cases  have  however  a  high  import 
contents  and  limited  backward  and  forward  linkages.  LOC  governments  have  also 
attempted  to  reduce  their  dependence  on  foreign  borrowing.  Existing  short-term 
stabilization  agreements  with  the  IMF  were  generally  not  renewed,  while  Brazil 
(2005) and  Argentina  (in  2006)  prepaid their  outstanding  debt  to  the  IMF.  A  few 
countries  also  restructured  their  foreign  debt,  as  in  the  case  of  Argentina  which 
successfully  renegotiated  its  debt  at  a  70  percent  discount.  As  a  result,  Latin 
America’s gross foreign debt declined from 42 percent of the regional GDP in 2002 to 
20 percent in 2007, while the debt net of foreign reserves fell from 33 to 8 percent of 
GDP.  
 
(ii) Labor market, income, and social policies-  Labor market policies. 
The LOC’s policy model differs from the liberal one in terms of the extent to which 
labor policies explicitly address  the  problems of unemployment,  informalization and 
instability,  falling  unskilled  wages,  diminishing  coverage  of  social  security,  and 
weakening  of  institutions  for  wage  negotiations  and  dispute  settlements.  Argentina 
enacted  income  policies  to  strengthen  the  purchasing  power  of  poor  and  middle 
income  families,  including  a  rise  in  minimum  wages,  a  large  scale  public  work 
program, a deliberate attempt to extend the coverage of formal employment, and the 
re-birth of trade-unions. In Uruguay the Frente Amplio administration reinstated the 
tripartite collective bargaining bodies comprising representatives of business, unions 
and government that negotiate wage settlements for the main industries. In Brazil the 
government  set  up  an  Economic  and  Social  Development  Council  composed  of 
representatives of business, labor and a wide variety of civil society organizations to 
advise  on  economic  and  social  issues.  At  the  same  time,  most  LOC  governments 
decreed hikes in minimum wages which were sizeable but far from excessive. Such 
restraint reflected  the  greater concern of policy makers  for creating  jobs  than  for 
improving earnings. It also reflects the recognition that, unless backed by increases in 
productivity, nominal wage raises may fuel inflation with scant effect on real wages.  
 
The  empirical  evidence  suggests  that  the  increases  of  minimum  wages  adopted 
during  the  2000s  likely  produced  an  equalizing  effect.  Indeed,  a  study  on  19 
Latin    American  countries  over    1997-2001  (Kristensen  and  Cunningham,  2006) 
shows that  minimum wages
12  raised  the  pay  at  the  bottom  of the  distribution  and 
were  generally  associated  with  lower  dispersion  of  earnings, as minimum wages 
were found to lift wages  in  both  the  formal  and  informal  sector. Indeed, though 
they  are  not  binding  in  the  informal  sector,  the  study  found  that  in  14  of  the  19 
countries analyzed the minimum  wages  enhanced the wage distribution also in this 
sector.  This suggests  they  represent  a  sort  of  ‘fair reservation  wage’  below  which 
                                                 
12  Minimum  wages  varied  between  20  and  143  percent  of  low-skilled  wages,  with  the  number  of 
beneficiaries varying between 1 and 20 percent of the labor force.       15 
the  supply  of  unskilled  labor  falls.  Table 2 suggests also that in the 2000s wage 
employment  rose  faster  than  self-  employment,  signifying  that  the  policy  of 
‘formalizing employment’ produced some results. A third factor, was a decline in the 
wage  premium  of  skilled  workers,  due  to  a  growing  supply  of  educated  workers 
(section 3.3),  and  a  shift  of  production  towards  the  more unskilled labor-intensive 
tradable sector.  
 
   Rising  public  social  expenditure  and  redistribution.  Public  social 
expenditure started rising already in the early-mid 1990s but accelerated its upward 
trend  since  the  early  2000s  in  most  of  the  region  (Table  4),  especially  in  LOC 
countries.  Most  of  the  expenditure  increase  concerned  social  security,  social 
assistance  and  education  (ibid).  The  rise  was  nearly  universal  and  of  the  21 
countries  of  the  region,  only Ecuador  had  in  2005  a  social  expenditure/GDP  ratio 
lower than in 1990-1 (CEPAL 2005). There still is a huge intra-regional variation in 
social  expenditure
13  but  it  appears  that the recent rise was proportionately greater 
in  low-income  countries.  A  first  factor  in  the  public  expenditure  rise  was  the 
increase in tax/GDP ratios. Changes in the structure of public expenditure plaid also a 
role.  For  instance,  the  debt  cancellation  enjoyed  by  HIPC  countries  permitted 
reallocating  to  social  activities monies  used  to  service  the  foreign  debt
14,  while 
ODA-recipients  increased their social expenditure, possibly  due to growing ‘social 
conditionality’ for the achievement of MDGs. 
 
Table 4. Average public social expenditure/GDP in LOC versus NO–LOC countries  
Social public expenditure as percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)  Year 
Total  Education  Health  social security  Housing 
1990   9.0  2.8  2.1  3.3  0.7 
1996  10.9  3.4  2.4  4.0  1.0 
2003  12.8  4.3  2.8  4.6  1.1 
Around 2006   13.3  4.3  2.9  4.6  1.4 
LOC   (2006 – 2003)  1.33  0.20  0.38  0.46  0.29 
NO LOC   (2006 – 2003)  0.48         -0.12  0.06  0.11  0.43 
Source. Author’s elaboration on the basis of the ECLAC database Badenso, Notes: the data refer to the 18 
countries analyzed in this study, including Bolivia (on the basis of national data) omitted in similar CEPAL 
studies (2007a). 
 
The  rise  in  public  social  expenditure likely generated  positive  redistributive effects. 
Analysis  of public social expenditure by income quintile for 18 countries over 1997-
2003 (CEPAL 2007,   Gasparini et al. 2007) suggest that: all  components  of  public 
social  expenditure  (including  social  security)  are  less  concentrated  than  private 
incomes;  expenditures   on   primary   education  and  social  assistance  are  strongly 
progressive, those on secondary education and healthcare are mildly progressive or 
broadly  proportional  (in  the  case  of  health  it  depends  on  the  approach  to  its 
financing),  those  on  tertiary  education are as concentrated  as  the  distribution of 
income. In turn, expenditure on social security (pensions, unemployment insurance) 
is  slightly  less  concentrated  than  that  of  private  income,  as  it  focuses  on  formal 
sector  workers  and  only  seldom  provides  non-contributory  benefits  to  informal 
sector workers and their families. These are average regional data and  things  vary 
between  the  three  main  country  groups  in  the  region  (Table  5,  panel  b). 
                                                 
13  In  2005,  Cuba,  Uruguay,  Brazil,  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Costarica  and  Panama  had  social 
expenditure/GDP ratios of  15-20  percent  (near  the OECD  level),  but  most  Central  American  and 
Andean countries had ratios below 10%.    
14Since 1996-7, Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua enjoyed debt cancellations equal to 5, 6 and 2 percent 
of their GDP. 
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Furthermore, there  are indications (CEPAL 2005) that the  incidence  of  such  public  
expenditure  is  becoming  more  progressive,  though  at  different  speeds  across  the 
region, as shown by the increase in enrolments in  secondary education mentioned 
above, greater  access to health  services, social assistance  (see   below)  and  anti-
poverty programs.   
 
Table  5.  Incidence  of  government  expenditure  by  quintile  (18  countries,  years  1997-2004)  and 
concentration coefficients of the public expenditure by three country groups.    
(Panel a) Shares of total public expenditure 
By sector and income quintile 
(Panel b) Concentration 
coefficients of public 
expenditure 








Group 1  Group 2  Group 3 
7.4  6.5  6.3  5.9  5.6  Education  -0.067  0.116  -0.138 
5.1  4.7  4.2  4.0  3.7  Health  0.074  -0.073  -0.192 
2.0  2.8  4.3  6.3  16.5  Soc 
Security 
0.504  0.568  0.349 
3.3  2.1  1.6  1.3  1.1  Soc Assist.  -0.089  -0.154  -0.484 
0.8  0.9  1.1  1.4  0.9  Housing  0.206  0.067  -0.026 
19.6  17.0  17.5  18.9  27.8  Total  0.143  0.042  0.044 
Source:  Elaboration  on  CEPAL  (2007a);  Note:  Group  1  includes  Bolivia,  El  Salvador,  Guatemala, 
Honduras, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru. Group 2 includes: Colombia, Dominican Republic, 
Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela. Group 3 includes: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costarica and Uruguay.    
 
As  shown  in  Table  5,  social  security  expenditure  is  not  progressive,  as  it  mainly 
covers formal sector workers with stable employment.  This  raises  the  question  of 
how best can  government  expand  social  security  coverage,  whether  by extending 
the formal sector or by setting up solidarity-based, non-contributory, universal funds 
providing  basic  benefits  (such  as  minimum  pensions)  to  informal  sector  workers 
and  their families.  Both  approaches  were  adopted  in  recent years though the 
latter  was  more  common.  For  instance,  several  LOC  countries  (Argentina,  Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile and Costarica) introduced non-contributory social pension which started 
addressing this problem (Table 6). 
 

















Cost of   
pension as 
% of GDP 
Argentina   70+  M  88  14  6  0.23 
Bolivia   65+  U  18  7  69  1.30 
Brazil 1   67+  M  140  9  5  0.20 
Brazil 2   60/55+  M  140  9  27  0.70 
Chile   65+  M  75  12  51  0.38 
Costa Rica   65+  M  26  8  20  0.18 
Uruguay  70+  M  100  17  10  0.62 
memo item             
Lesotho    70+  U  21  8  53  1.43 
Mauritius   60+  U  60  10  100  2.00 
South Africa  65/58+  M  109  7  60  1.40 
Source: HelpAgeInternational (2006b) Notes: Brazil 1 and 2 = Beneficio de Prestacao Continuada;  
Previdencia Rural.     
 
Prior to the recent changes in tax and expenditure policies,  the overall redistributive 
effect of tax-and-transfer operations in Latin America was much smaller than in the 
OECD, with the exception of Argentina and Costa Rica. An analysis of tax incidence 
in 11 Latin American countries for the late 1990s and 2001-2 (Cetrangolo and Gomez-
Sabaini  2006)  concluded  that  the  distribution  of  income  after  taxation (but  before 
transfers)  remained  broadly  unchanged  and  worsened in  Mexico  and  Nicaragua,  as   17 
the tax system mainly relied on regressive or proportional taxes. In contrast, in most 
countries public expenditure redistributed income in a perceptible way. Yet,  as noted 
above,  the  increase  in  income  and  wealth  taxes  recorded  between the mid-late 
1990s and 2007  in several countries should have improved, if moderately, the 
progressivity of the tax system though no new analysis are available in this regard. 
 
 
-  Conditional  transfer  programs.  During  the  last  10-15  years  most 
governments  introduced  targeted  social  assistance  programs  to  complement  the 
coverage  of  formal  social  security.  Contrary  to  the  small,  donor  dependent,  and 
poorly  sequenced  and  targeted  Social  Emergency  and Investment  Funds  (SEF  and 
SIF) introduced in the late 1980s to soften the resistance to and impact of structural 
adjustment, conditional transfers are better funded by  the  state  (second column of 
Table 7), cover an important share of the population  at  risk, and are directed to old 
and  new  political  constituencies  such  as  the  urban  and  rural  poor.  Such  programs 
include:  conditional  transfers  aiming  at  reducing  poverty  and  child  labor  and  at 
ensuring that children remain in school, and have access to health services and proper  
nutrition  (as  in  the  case  of  Brazil’s  famous Bolsa Familia);  temporary  employment 
schemes  for  the construction  of  public  infrastructure (as in Argentina’s Programma 
Jefas y Jefes de Hogares and Uruguay’s PANES); training of unemployed workers and 
youth with the aim of facilitating their access to formal sector jobs; subsidized formal 
sector  employment  for  the  youth;  and  the  promotion  of  SME.  Several  studies 
document the favorable distributional impact of such transfers. For instance, an  IPEA 
study  (cited  in  CEPAL  2006)  found  that  in  Brazil  government  transfers  (social 
pensions  and  Bolsa  Família)  explained one  third of the decline in income inequality 
observed between 2000 and 2006.    
 
     Table 7. Summary of some main social programs introduced in recent times in the region 
Program (reference year)   Cost (% 
of GDP)  
Number of  
beneficiaries  
Monthly subsidy ($) 
Plan Jefas y Jefes (Argentina, 2002)   0,80 
1.85 millions 
workers  
 US$45 (2002) 
US$ 150 (2007) 
Plan Nacional Emergencia  (Bolivia, 
2002)  
0,86 
1.6% of Active 
pop. 
63 $ Wage manual 
workers  
PANES (Uruguay, 2005)   0.50 
7.2% of active 
pop.  
55 $   
Bolsa Familia (Brazil, 2005)  0.36 
11.1 million 
families 
62 R$ for  poor families 
15 R$ for children 
30 R$ for youth 
Chile Solidario (Chile 2005)   0.08  256.000 families 
 8-21 $ depending on 
poverty intensity 
Oportunidades  (México, 2006)  0.40 
5 million families 
       (18%  of 
pop) 
12-74 $ depends on 
educ.level 
17$ family health 
Bono desarrollo umano (Ecuador 2005)  0.60 
    5  million 
people  
       (40%  of 
pop)   
           15 $ 
Familias en accion (Colombia 2007)  0.20 
1.7 million 
families 
8-33  US$  (educ 
subsidy/child) 
30  US$  (health  subsidy/ 
family) 
 Source: Authors’ compilation on Fiszbein and Schady (2009) and Bouillon and Tejerina (2007). 
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4. Regression analysis  
4.1 Dataset and matrix of correlation coefficients  
The understanding the relative impact on inequality of the factors discussed in Part 3 
required to compile a dataset on Income Distribution in Latin America (IDLA). IDLA 
includes annual data for 18 Latin American countries, for the 18 years 1990-2007 and 
the variables listed in Table 8. The database thus includes 324 (18x18) cells for each 
variable, though missing data reduce the number of data strings with non-zero cells. 
The  dependent  variable  is  the  Gini  coefficient  of  the  distribution  of  household 
disposable  income
15.  The  explanatory  variables  included  in  the  regression  are 
described in Table 8. They belong to five sets of factors: (i) the  current business cycle 
measured  by  the  growth  rate  of  GDP  per  capita,  and  expected  ex  ante  to  have  a 
negative sign (ii) the distribution of human capital (i.e. the Gini of the distribution of 
years  of  education  among  workers  lagged  one  year,  expected  ex-ante  to  reduce 
inequality)  (iii)  external  conditions  i.e.  international  terms  of  trade,  migrant 
remittances (both of which have an uncertain ex-ante effect on inequality, besides the 
effect mediated through other variables), as well as FDI and portfolio flows (expected 
ex-ante to have a un-equalizing effect), besides the effects mediated through GDP 
growth and other channels; and (iv) public policies. These include the Real Effective 
Exchange Rate (REER) which proxies macroeconomic policy, and which is expected to 
reduce inequality for the reasons given in Part 3; the minimum wage interacted with 
the share of formal sector workers (expected ex-ante to reduce inequality) as proxy 
labor market policies. As for redistributive policies, the following variables were used 
in  regression  analysis:  the  ratio  of  direct  to  indirect  taxes,  the  share  of  public 
expenditure on social security as a share of GDP (both expected to reduce inequality) 
and the ratio of pension coverage in the top versus bottom quintile; (v) two political 
dummy variables, i.e. the ‘social democratic’ dummy, which is equal to one when a 
country is ruled by a social-democratic government and zero in all other cases, and 
the  ‘populist’  dummy  which  takes  the  value  of  one  in  the  years  during  which 
Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua were ruled by a radical-populist regime and zero in 
all other cases. Both dummies are expected to reduce inequality (beyond the impact 






                                                 
15  Of  the  (18x18)  324  observations  of  the  Gini  coefficient  of  income  inequality,  175  derive  from  the 
SEDLAC database (www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/sedlac/eng/statistics.php) and are obtained through a 
standard  procedure  using  household  surveys  data,  11  are  taken  from  WIDER’s  WIID2c 
(www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm), 3 from Badeinso-Eclac 2008 (www.eclac.cl/estadisticas/bases/), 13 
from WDI 2007, and one (Argentina, 2007) from national sources. 98 data-points were interpolated by 
filling gaps of one or two years in time series with stable trends. In three cases, interpolation was used to 
fill gaps of 3 years, and in 3 cases of 4 years, i.e. for a total of 21 data-points referring mostly to the 
early 1990s. Finally, 23 cells (for Ecuador,  Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Paraguay in the early 1990s) 
remain  blank.  A  successful  check  was  carried  out  to  ensure  that  the  data  filled  in  by  interpolation 
replicated  the  trend  of  other  income  concepts  with  available  data.  In  most  cases,  the  data  refer  to 
disposable  household  income  per  capita.  In  a  few  cases,  it  was  not  possible  to  find  out  the  income 
concept  used  for  computing  the  Gini  coefficients,  as  this  information  was  not  included  in  the  survey 
questionnaires.  This  might  introduce  some  error  in  the  measurement  of  the  dependent  variable. 
However, as it was possible to verify a strong co-variance between trends of Gini coefficients based on 
different income concepts, this bias may affect the value of the country intercepts in the fixed effect 
estimation, without affecting the parameters of the explanatory variables. All data cover the nation as a 
whole, except for Argentina (where surveys initially covered the Greater Buenos Aires, then the 15 main 
cities, and later the 28 main cities), Bolivia (where between 1990-95 the coverage was only urban), and 
Uruguay (urban coverage only).        19 
 
Table 8. Definition, description and data sources of the variables used in regression analysis  
variable 
name 
Variable label  Source  Unit of Measure 
Gini  Gini coefficient of the current distribution of 





GDP/c gr  Per capita average annual growth rates GDP 
at constant market prices  
ECLAC 
 
Percentage based on US dollar 





Education Gini index for working population 
of 25-64 years old, lagged one year  SEDLAC  Percentage points  
Tot- fob  terms of trade, fob  ECLAC  Index, 2000=100 
Remittanc
es 
Workers' remittances / GDP 
UNCTAD  Percentage of GDP 
FDI  Net Stock of Foreign Direct Investment/GDP  UNCTAD  Percentage of GDP 
Capital 
flows 
Portfolio investment/GDP  
ECLAC  Percentage of  GDP 
REER  Indices of Real Effective Exchange Rate  Econ Survey of 
L. America and 
the Caribbean 
Index, 2000=100 
Min-wage  Minimum wage   ECLAC  Index, 2000=100 
Direct tax   Taxes on income, profits, capital gains, 
property/ GDP 
ECLAC  as a percentage of GDP 
Indirect 
tax  
(General taxes on goods and services + 
taxes on specific goods and services) / GDP 




Public expenditure on social security and 
social assistance / GDP 
 
ECLAC  As a percentage of GDP 
Q5/Q1 
Pensions 





Dummy denoting a country/year with a 




1(social-democratic), 0 (all 
other cases)  
Populist  Dummy denoting a country/year with a 




1(populist), 0 (all other cases) 
Source: author’s compilation 
 
 
Analysis  of  the  matrix  of  bilateral  correlation  coefficients  (omitted  for  reasons  of 
space) among the 14 explanatory variables included in regression analysis shows that 
–  of  the  88  bilateral  correlation  coefficients  contained  in  such  matrix  –  only  that 
between  the  ‘ratio  of  pensions  coverage between  the  top  and  bottom  quintile’  and 
‘public  expenditure  on  social  security’  is  sizeable  (r  =  -.64)  and  can  cause 
multicollinearity problems. Another four coefficients have values of around 0.5, while 
all  others  are  very  low  (0.002-  0.3)  suggesting  that  the  explanatory  variables  are 
independent among each other, that problems of multicollinearity should be limited, 
and that – contrary to what could be suggested by economic theory - there is no need 
to develop a structural multi-equation model.   
 
 
4.2. Estimation procedure and regression results  
The IDLA database is organized as a tri-dimensional matrix, with 18 countries on one 
axis, 18 years on the second and the dependent and 14 explanatory variables on the 
third. Such kind of dataset demands that the procedure chosen for the estimation of   20 
the  determinants  of  income  inequality  takes  into  account  that  each  country  is 
observed over several periods. Such model takes therefore the following form: 
      it t i it it u y X GINI + + + + = h b a  
 
where Giniit is the coefficient of the distribution of household disposable income per capita, X a 
vector  of  14  explanatory  variables  (Table  8),  the  subscripts  i  and  t  represent  respectively  the 
countries and the years of the panel, hi the error term for each country, yt the error term for each 
year, and uit a joint error term for countries and time periods, while a and are b parameters to be 
estimated.  Given  the  nature  of  this  dataset,  the  OLS  procedure  tends  to  yield  inefficient  and 
distorted estimates of the values of  a  and b (Baltagi 2006).  The  estimation  procedure  best 
suited to situations in which ui varies from country to country is the fixed effects (FE) 
model in which ui is not treated as a random variable. This means that this estimation 
procedure  generates,  for  each  of  the  18  countries  considered,  an  intercept  which 
captures specific country effects reflecting differences in geography, institutions and 
unobservables. The Hausman test confirms that the fixed effects model is preferable 
to the random effect model.   
 
The regression analysis has been carried out as follows: the ratio of pension coverage 
of the top to the bottom quintile has been dropped due to multicollinearity problems 
mentioned  above,  while  the  capital  flows/GDP  was  also  dropped  due  to  lack  of 
sufficient  data.  To  capture  the  progressivity  of  the  tax  system,  the  ratio  of  direct 
taxes/GDP was divided by that of indirect taxes/GDP (and further standardized by the 
overall  tax/GDP  ratio).  The  regressors  have  been  introduced  in  a  stepwise  mode 
starting with the two political dummies (‘social democratic’ and ‘populist’), followed, 
one by one, by the different sets of factors discussed in Part 3, i.e.: the growth rate of 
GDP, educational inequality of the labor force, external economic conditions (terms of 
trade, remittances, and FDI), macroeconomic policies (proxied by the real exchange 
rate expressed in quadratic form),  labor market policies (proxied by the minimum 
wage index interacted with the share of formal sector employment), and redistributive 
policies  (i.e.  the  ratio  of  direct  to  indirect  taxes,  and  social  expenditure/GDP).  The 
introduction of each new variable entails a reduction in the number of observations 
which drops from 301 in Model 1 to 222 in Model 8.  
 
The results show that, when introduced all alone, the two dummy variables are highly 
significant  with  the  ‘populists’  having  a  somewhat  bigger  redistributive  (1.9  Gini 
points)  effect  than  the  ‘social-democrats’  (1.4  Gini  points).  As  expected,  with  the 
introduction of other variables (particularly the policy variables) the parameters of the 
two dummies decline in value and loose significance, though they remain significant in 
most of the eight models in Table 9. The populist dummy is non significant in three of 
the  eight  models,  likely  because  the  small  number  of  years  in  which  this  variable 
takes values different from zero, while the ‘social democratic’ is non significant only in 
one  model.  Most  importantly  both  dummies  are  significant  in  the  most  complete 
model,  i.e. model 8. In turn GDP growth has, as expected, a negative sign and  is 
generally, if weakly, significant. But it appears to have a limited impact on income 
inequality; for instance a six percent growth of GDP/C reduces inequality by 0.2-0.4 
Gini points, depending on which of the eight model of Table 9 is selected. The Gini of 
educational achievements is strongly and significantly related to the Gini income, and 
its  parameters  range  between  0.6-0.7  in  all  models  in  which  such  variables  is 
included. This means that the observed average drop of 2 or 3 points in the Gini of 
educational  achievements  over  2002  and  2007  (with  higher  values  for  Brazil  and 
Guatemala) explains 1.5-2 points of the decline in the Gini of disposable during the 
same period. As for the impact of the international environment, the terms of trade   21 
turns  out  to  reduce  inequality  moderately.  For  instance,    given  their    33  percent 
improvement in relation to the 1990s, and  given values of the  
 
Table  9.  Fixed  effects  regression  results  (dependent  variable:  Gini  coefficient  of  the  distribution  of 
disposable income/c)  
Variable (sign expected ex ante  
on the basis of theory)   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
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Public expenditure on  
social security/GDP         (=,-)                -0.3183 
[0.1495]** 
















Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  yes 
Observations  301  301  252  251  246  241  239  222 
R-squared  0.17  0.17  0.30  0.34  0.35  0.36  0.38  0.45 
 Source: author’s calculations, Notes: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%;   
^ significant at 18%;  
 
 
regression parameters ranging between -0.13 and – 0.020, the average Gini decline 
during the 2000s due  to  this  variable is  estimated at  about 0.4-0.6  points. In 
turn,    migrant  remittances    are  non  significant  in  all  specifications,  while  FDI/GDP 
appears strongly and very significantly un- equalizing, but rose only minimally during 
the last decade. Also the parameters of the linear and quadratic terms of the REER are 
strongly significant, confirming that, for instance a 20 percent devaluation of REER 
reduces income inequality by about 1.2 points. As for the redistributive policies, the 
regression  analysis  corroborates  the  predictions  of  Part  3  about  of  their  equalizing 
impact.  For  instance,  doubling  of  the  minimum  wage  index  and  considering  the  3 
percentage points expansion of the formal employment on the total (Table 2) would 
induce  a  drop  in  income  inequality  by  some  1.2  Gini  points.  Likewise,  the  1.3 
percentage  points  rise  in  public  social  expenditure  observed  in  LOC  countries  over 
2003-2006  (Table  4)  induced  a  statistically  significant  drop  in  the  Gini  of  income 
inequality of about 0.4 points. A bit less marked but highly significant and with the 
expected sign is the parameter of the ratio of direct to indirect taxes.              22 
 
All in all, Table 9 – and in particular Model 8 - show that all the signs of the estimated 
parameters coincide with those expected ex-ante on the basis of the theories discussed 
in Part 3. The parameters are also stable across the different specifications, a sign that 
their values are correctly estimated and sufficiently reliable for computing the relative 
weight  of  each  set  factors  used  to  explain  the  inequality  decline  observed  between 
2002 and 2007. Among all the variables considered, those with the biggest impact on 
income  inequality  are  (in  descending  order):  the  drop  in  the  Gini  of  educational 
achievements  due  to  sustained  investments  in  education  which  affected  the  skill 
premium; the choice of an appropriate REER; the labor market and social expenditure 
policies; and the ‘social democratic’ and ‘populist‘ dummies which measure the effect 
on  inequality  of  progressive  policies  and  conditions  other  than  those  explicitly 
considered  in  the  regression  analysis.  The  terms  of  trade  gains  and  the  growth 
recovery  also  contributed  to  the  decline  in  inequality  over  2002-2007  but  in    a 
quantitatively less important way, while migrant remittances and portfolio flows were 
not significant, and the stock FDI/GDP (which changed little over 2002-7) had a lesser 
impact on inequality, though its parameter is highly significant.        
 
These satisfactory results have to be probed for the possibility of reverse causation and 
endogeneity.  Reverse  causation  is  normally  tested  by  means  of  the  Granger  test. 
However, such test is not suitable for the IDLA dataset in which each variable has at 
most 18, and often fewer, observations. It is therefore more appropriate to deal with 
this problem from a theoretical standpoint
 16. In turn, solution of possible problems of 
endogeneity, requires developing a simultaneous equations system, which is however 
difficult in a panel with only 18 observations. This means that the results in Table 9 are 
to  be  interpreted  as  correlations  rather  than  causal  explanations,  though  the 
theoretical discussion in Part 3 lends support to a prudent causal interpretation of the 
results obtained.  
 
On the whole, it appears that improvements in educational inequality, favorable terms 
of trade, and pro-poor policies contributed to reduce income inequality. These results 
contradict  the  conclusions  of  Perez  Caldentey  and  Vernengo  (2008)  according  to 
which the  recent  growth  acceleration and fall in inequality have  nothing  to  do  with 
the  policy  changes introduced by governments in the economic and social sphere. 
These authors are right, however, in noting that the recent developments have only 




                                                 
16 In this regard, it must be noted that reverse causality makes no sense in the majority of the relations in 
Table 9. For instance, it is not plausible that changes in domestic inequality affect the real exchange rate, 
or can affect lagged, exogenous or policy variables (such as Gini income 1990, migrant remittances, terms 
of trade, ratio of direct/indirect taxes, ratio of pension coverage Q1/Q5, and minimum wage). Also, a 
fall/increase in Gini income may affect the Gini of years of education only after a considerable lag. It is 
also implausible that a decrease in inequality will affect the expenditure on social insurance/GDP, which 
depends on the coverage of formal employment as far as pensions are concerned, and on tax revenue and 
public expenditure allocation for conditional cash transfers. The only relation in which reverse causation 
may be plausible is that between the Gini inequality and the growth rate of GDP/c. In this case, however, 
this relation would be characterized by time lags, thus excluding the possibility of reverse causation on 
synchronous data. Furthermore, the literature on the impact of higher inequality on GDP/c growth is not 
unanimous.  Neokeynesian  and  neoclassical  models  postulate  a  positive  relation  between  these  two 
variables, while ‘political economy’ and ‘incentives’ models assume a negative one. On the whole, reverse 
causality does not seem plausible.  
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5.  Tentative  conclusions:  is  ‘prudent  redistribution  with 
growth’  reducing  income  inequality  in  Latin  America?  Will 
the current crisis undo it?  
The  spread  of  democracy  and  dissatisfaction  with  Washington  Consensus 
policies  have  lead  to  the  elections  of  LOC  governments  which  introduced  – 
thanks also to favorable external conditions – economic reforms broadly inspired 
by  a  ‘prudent  redistribution  with  growth’  paradigm  committed  to  reducing  the 
inequality inherited from the colonial past and exacerbated by the liberal policies of 
the 1980s and 1990s. With the exception of Venezuela and Bolivia, the new policy 
model  did  not  introduce  radical  measures  altering  the  distribution  of  assets. 
Rather,  it  emphasized  orthodox  objectives  such  as  macro-economic  stability,  fiscal 
prudence,  and  the  preservation  of  free  trade  and  capital  flows.  Yet,  in  a  clear 
departure  from  the  1990s,  the  new  model  relies  on  managed exchange  rates, a 
neutral or countercyclical fiscal policy, reduced dependence on foreign capital, rapid 
accumulation of reserves, and an active role of the state in the field of labor and social 
policies. 
 
In addition, as  in the European  social  democracies, LOC and moderate centre-right 
governments  raised  the tax/GDP ratio (a  trend  facilitated  but  not  fully  explained, 
neither in its timing nor in its extent, by the recent gains in terms of trade gains) 
as well as public spending on education, conditional cash transfers, and other forms 
of social assistance. There is micro evidence that higher public and private spending 
reduced inequality in education, improved the distribution of human capital among the 
workforce, and reduced the skill premium. Redistribution  was  also  pursued  via macro 
policies favoring the labor-intensive traded sector as well as changes in labor market 
policies  and  institutions.  Also  in  this  case,  the  changes  introduced  were  far  from 
radical,  and  yet  helped  increasing  labor  participation  and  the  share  of  workers 
covered by formal contracts, and reducing unemployment. 
 
Beyond  the  problems  posed  by  the  current  financial  crisis,  the  Latin  American 
governments  still  face  formidable  hurdles  in  deepening  these  reforms.  First,  the 
trend towards  rising  taxation  and  social  expenditure  needs  to  continue  in  part  of 
the  region  with  the  objective  of  building  a  lean  welfare  state  that  avoids  the high 
costs of the European model but offers universal coverage. Second, the fiscal revenue 
needed to  sustain  future social expenditure will have to come from a diversification 
of  the  economy  into  new  labor-  and  skilled-intensive  sectors.  Third,  an 
intensification  of  the  new  policy  model  by  LOC  governments  in  the  region 
faces  considerable  political  opposition,  as  shown  by  the  case  of  Bolivia  and 
Argentina,  where  interest  groups  have  nearly  stalled  attempts  at  redistribution. 
Meanwhile, the financial crisis may dig a gap between the responses expected from 
LOC governments and  what  they  can  actually do under the recessionary conditions 
of 2009 and part of 2010. An unchecked deterioration of living conditions might lead 
to a collective perception that the crisis is due to inadequate policy responses. Failure 
to  stay – if in part - the new policy course  may  cause  a  credibility  gap,  undermine 
electoral  support,  and  push  the  region  towards  its  traditional  path  of  unequal 
development or towards more radical solutions, possibly overturning in this way the 
inequality gains of the recent past.  
 
A simulation of model 8 in Table 9 suggests that income inequality is likely to have 
stagnated in 2008 and to have risen by 2-3 points in 2009 due to deterioration in 
some  of  the  model’s  explanatory  variables  such  as  terms  of  trade,  migrant 
remittances,  growth  of  GDP/c  and  so  on.  Adverse  changes  in  other  variable  not   24 
included  in  the  model  –  such  a  drop  in  capital  inflows,  rising  interest  spreads  on 
international loans, and rises in capital flights – may affect further income inequality. 
These  recessionary  pressures  are  very  likely  to  cause  a  decline  in  tax  revenue,  a 
phenomenon that may be aggravated by the tax cuts introduced as relief measures as 
part  of  the  policy  response  to  the  crisis.  The  ability  to  redistribute  via  the  budget 
would thus be eroded, unless a countercyclical fiscal policy is adopted.  
 
On the positive side, it must be noted that the current crisis hits a region in better 
conditions than those prevailing on occasion of the crises of 1982-4 and 1998-2002. 
To start with, the crisis is mainly a real economy crisis, and not a financial crisis, as in 
the US or as experienced in the region during the 1980s and 1990s. This means that 
fewer funds are needed than in the past to recapitalize ailing banks. Second, many 
countries of the region are in a position to adopt countercyclical fiscal policies and to 
incur  substantial  deficits  for  a  couple  of  years,  thanks  to  declines  in  the  public 
debt/GDP  ratio,  large  accumulation  of  currency  reserves,  and  decline  in  inflation 
achieved in the first part of the decade (see Part 3). Central Banks can also carry out 
a more flexible monetary policy without endangering their inflation targets. In turn, 
the devaluation of the exchange rate is likely to raise the REER (correcting in this way 
its recent appreciation in some countries, Brazil ahead of all) with a possible favorable 
impact on inequality. Third, the impact of the recession via the international trade will 
not  affect  all  countries  equally  hard.  Mexico,  Central  America  and  other  nations 
strongly integrated with North America and Europe are likely to suffer an important 
trade shock, but the Andean and Southern Cone nations which have been increasingly 
trading  with  East  Asia  are  likely  to  be  less  affected  due  to  the  milder  recession 
experienced by this region. Fourth, most countries have introduced in the recent years 
important  public  works  and  cash  transfer  programs  (Table  7).  At  the  moment  85 
million Latin-Americans receive a subsidy under some kind of CCT schemes (UNDP 
2009). This prior institutional development ought to facilitate the expansion of safety 
nets during the crisis and preserve in this way some of the recent inequality decline, 
though not all countries may have the capacity to do so in a timely manner. Finally, 
current and future the inequality trends will depend on the ability of governments to 
sustain the measures introduced during the recent past in the field of direct taxation, 
social expenditure, labor market policies and a gradual drive towards an integrated, 
universal social protection system. As noted, the countercyclical fiscal policy followed 
in the first part of this decade should permit to sustain some of these programs in the 
years ahead and to preserve part of the inequality gains achieved during the recent 
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